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Abstract 
The article assesses the significance of the League of Nations as an experiment in world order 
and explains its relevance to the contemporary world order. It does this by studying three world 
order institutions introduced by the League namely, intergovernmental organisations, collective 
security, and international law.  
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1 Introduction  
In political and legal discourse, but also in conventional thinking, the League of Nations (LoN) 
is usually depicted as a failure because it failed to prevent the Second World War, although it 
was created on the ruins of the First World War with the main goal of preventing another 
devastating world war. Commentators offer a litany of reasons to explain that failure; the most 
well-rehearsed being its defective institutional design, its lack of resources, its lack of 
enforcement powers, but also the failure of its members to honour their commitments.1 Against 
the League’s failure, its successor organisation, the United Nations (UN), is presented instead 
as an organisation that was created to overcome the defects of the LoN.2 
 As will be discussed, this is, however, a rather harsh and not necessarily an accurate 
assessment of the LoN, which is the result of a particular set of assumptions about the creation, 
operation and purpose of the League. In fact, there are diverse and rather contradictory 
representations of the LoN: the LoN is depicted as a movement from law to politics but also a 
reverse movement from politics to law; a movement from utopia to reality but also its reverse 
from reality to utopia; a movement from anarchy to order and back to anarchy or a movement 
from war to peace as well as its reverse.3 Such contradictory representations that lead to 
conflicting assessments reveal that the LoN was a more complex phenomenon than the 
aforementioned binary representations imply and that it was called upon to play many different 
roles.4 Consequently, representations and assessments of the League should be more nuanced 
and should explain their point of departure. As a matter of fact, the LoN may have been all the 
above to different degrees and in different times of its existence. This is because, in effect, the 
LoN was, as major world projects are, a compromise between the forces of sovereignty and 
 
 
1 See Lord Cecil’s and M. Paul –Boncour’s speeches at the final session of the League Assembly, 9 April 1946, 
in R.B. Henig (ed.), The League of Nations (1973) pp. 164-8.  
2 The UN was however moulded on the LoN’s image. As was noted: “[t]he student of international organisation 
must recognise the United Nations for what it quite properly is, a revised League, no doubt improved in some 
respects, possibly weaker in others, but nonetheless a League, a voluntary association of nations, carrying on 
largely in the League tradition and by the League methods.” Leland M. Goodrich, “From League of Nations to 
United Nations”’, 1 International Organization (1947) pp. 3, 23; See also Charles Webster, “The Making of the 
Charter of the United Nations”, 32 History (1947) pp. 16; Frank P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations 
(1952) p. 812: “In its purposes and principles, its institutions and its methods, the United nations bears at every 
point the mark of the experience of the League”.   
3 See in general Charles K. Webster and Sydney Herbert, The League of Nations in Theory and Practice (1933);  
Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918-1935 (1945); Edward H. Carr, The Twenty 
Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: Reissued with a New Preface from Michael Cox (2016). 
4 “Conceived originally as a political system for keeping the peace, it became from the first the unique and 
universal centre for every activity in which international cooperation was needed”. Frank P. Walters, “The 
League of Nations”, in E. Luard (ed.), The Evolution of International Organisations (1966) pp. 25. 
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nationalism and the forces of internationalism and institutionalism that existed and operated in 
parallel to each other but often in competition with each other. A cursory reading of its 
Covenant actually reveals the cohabitation of its universal and aspirational ideals with more 
traditional ideas of how international relations are to be conducted.  
 In view of the above, I prefer a different depiction of the LoN; namely, that of a great 
experiment as characterised by one of its architects, Robert Cecil.5 Experiments test new 
knowledge and are based on a process of trial and error. More specifically, experiments test 
new ideas which evolve from existing knowledge and their  success or failure has further 
implications; itdetermines future developments by adopting the ideas that proved to be 
successful or by adapting and revising existing ideas through a process of reflection and lessons 
learned or by rejecting the ideas that failed conspicuously. Depicting the LoN as an experiment 
refers to its particular vision of how world order is to be organised following the devastation 
of the First World War, the collapse of the 19th century world order based on the balance of 
power, and the world-scale problems that states and people faced. In my opinion, such depiction 
is more fitting because it presents the LoN as the realisation of a political project of world order 
informed by past trajectories with their successes and failures but alsoone that was mainly 
oriented towards a novel vision of world order.6 As one commentator put it, the creation of the 
LoN was an “extraordinary event” because there had been nothing like it before but also there 
was very little to suggest its possibility.7  
 Starting from this premise, in this article I will not deal with the standard question that 
has dominated scholarship of why the League failed but I will try to uncover the deeper 
significance of the LoN as an experiment in world order and explain its relevance to the 
contemporary world order.  
 The article begins by explaining the concept of world order as well as the LoN’s concept 
of world order. The article then presents three world order institutions introduced by the LoN 
 
5 Robert Cecil, A Great Experiment: An Autobiography (1941); M. Patrick Cottrell, The League of Nations: 
Enduring Legacies of the First Experiment at World Organization, (2017) ch. 1.
6 According to Zimmern, supra note 2, p. 271, the Covenant “… represent[s] a dovetailing of doctrines and the 
adjustment of widely differing and, in some cases, contending wills. Thus the final work is not, like the usual 
treaty or constitution, a neat and orderly arrangement of chapters, sections and causes …”.  He then categorises 
the different articles in the Covenant as representing Concert systems, Monroe doctrine sys ems, Hague 
conference systems, system of world services and system of Hue and Cry; supra note 2, p. 271-3. Inis Claude 
Jr., Swords into Plowshares: the Problems and Progress of International Organization (4th ed., 1971) p. 41-56; 
Mark Azower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea, (2012).   
7 David Armstrong, James Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd, and John Redmond, From Versailles to Maastricht, 
International Organization in the Twentieth Century (1996) p. 7. Walters, supra note 2, p. 26: “… it was 
something entirely new in the political development of the world”.  
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and I use this term in Buzan’s sense of “primary institutions” that is, institutions around which 
world order governance evolves.8 These institutions are: intergovernmental organisations, 
collective security, and international law. The article then goes on to consider their implications 
for and legacies on the contemporary world order. My main contention is that the LoN should 
not be viewed as an end in itself but as a stepping stone to building our contemporary world 
order, constituting its protoplasmic ancestor.  
 
2 World Order and the League of Nations 
A world order is a governance arrangement which regulates the relations between and among 
states and other actors in the world in order to deliver public goods such as peace and justice.9 
According to Bull, a world order is a fundamental and primordial concept because it is not only 
about order among states but also about order within states and the wider international political 
system, whose participants are not only states but also individuals.10   
 World orders are political, legal, social, and institutional constructs. As constructs, 
world orders can either be heuristic by categorising and explaining a set of existing 
arrangements or perspectival and prescriptive describing what the governance arrangements 
should be. Being prescriptive, a word order is informed by a certain ideological framework, 
preference, worldview, or a vision of how such a world order should look like in order to 
achieve the desired aim. It is for this reason why I use the word vision in the title of this article. 
Such vision can be set in motion by putting in place corresponding governance arrangements 
and testing them in practice and time from where the notion of experiment emerges. By 
governance arrangements I mean institutions, norms, organs, and practices. It transpires from 
this that a world order has a normative, institutional and teleological dimension.11 The LoN did 
exactly that: it put in place and codified the governance arrangements corresponding to its 
particular vision of a post First World War order which was to replace the previous world order 
based on the balance of power, ad hoc conferences and institutions, informal arrangements, 
secrecy, unrestrained recourse to war, Euro-centrism, and colonialism. The aims of the new 
 
8 See Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? (2004) p. 161–204.   
9 A world order is “the system of authoritative rules, norms, institutions, and practices by means of which any 
collectivity manages its common affairs.” John G. Ruggie, ‘Forward’, in T. Weiss and R. Thakur (eds.), Global 
Governance and the UN (2010) pp. xv
10 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (2nd ed., 1977) p. 21. 
 
11 Nicholas Tsagourias and Nigel D. White, Collective Security: Theory, Law and Practice (2013) p. 27.  
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world order instituted by the LoN were “to promote international co-operation and to achieve 
international peace and security” and these aims were to be achieved:   
“by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war;  
by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations;  
by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule 
of conduct among Governments; and  
by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the 
dealings of organised peoples with one another”12  
 
 The Covenant then laid down the normative and institutional me ns and methods to 
attain the peaceful settlement of disputes and the improvement of the global welfare through 
cooperation in social, economic, labour, or health matters.13 The above represent the particular 
hallmarks of the LoN’s version of world order but, zooming out to look at the contribution of 
the LoN to the concept of world order in general, the LoN as a whole provided the site and the 
framework of world order governance by introducing its main governance institutions. These 
governance institutions were, among others, intergovernmental organisations, multilateralism, 
sovereign equality, self-determination, collective security, diplomacy, dispute resolution, 
international law.   
 In what follows I will present three such institutions – intergovernmental organisations, 
collective security, and international law - in order to demonstrate their enduring relevance and 
consequently the enduring legacy of the LoN.  
3 The League of Nations and World Governance Institutions 
3.1  Intergovernmental organisations   
The creation of the LoN marks “a move to institutions” in the sense of international 
intergovernmental organisations.14 Intergovernmental organisations are created by states to 
deal with common problems and to pursue common interests by pooling assets, by working 
 
12 Preamble to the Covenant.  
13 See Art. 23 of the Covenant. According to Zimmern, the LoN is “in fact, an instrument of co-operation”, 
supra note 2, p. 289. 
14 David Kennedy, “The Move to Institutions”, 8 Cardozo Law Review (1987) pp. 841. See also Glenda Sluga, 
“Remembering 1919: International Organizations and the Future of International Order”, 95 International 
A振airs (2019) pp. 25, international organisations and intergovernmental organisations will be used 
interchangeably in the article.  
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through common organs, by managing activities, and by elaborating norms. It is the efficiency 
in attaining common goals through common organs and action and through a common 
reference framework that makes intergovernmental organisations appealing to states. By 
creating such organisations states can also manage the enforcement of their common 
commitments and influence the conditions of change. Although international organisations 
operate within the bounds of their constitutive document and are generally based on state 
consent, their creation and operation signifies, on the one hand, the cession of portions of state 
sovereignty and, on the other, the acquisition of relative autonomy by the organisation in order 
to influence or regulate the behaviour of states in the pursuit of the common good.  
 In the same vein the LoN was established by states as an inter-state organisation, not a 
supranational one, in order to pursue their common interests. States constituted the basic unit 
of its structure and operation, but the League was also endowed with common organs to serve 
the common good. What, however, makes the LoN exceptional is not only that it ushered the 
era of intergovernmental organisations as sites of governance but, more importantly, that it 
marked the establishment of the first global political institution of world order and global 
governance. In contrast to existing at the time organisations whose membership was limited 
and their vocation limited mainly to administrative matters, the LoN was or aspired to be global 
and inclusive as far as membership and aims were concerned. With regard to its aims, it had a 
comprehensive mandate which as was noted above included peace and justice in the form of 
self-determination, health, labour, women’s rights, minority protection. Moreover, the LoN had 
permanent organs – political and administrative - in the form of an Assembly, a Council, and 
a Secretariat. The Secretariat provided administrative leadership and support in order to see the 
League’s mandate implemented.15 Having a Secretariat and, generally, having an international 
civil service which was appointed on the basis of expertise, was independent from national 
loyalties, acted as the guardian of the LoN’s interests and was answerable to the League was 
 
15 Martin David Dubin, “Transgovernmental Processes in the League of Nations”, 37 International Organization 
(1983) pp. 469; David Macfadyen, Michael D. V. Davies, Marilyn Norah Carr, and John Burley, Eric 
Drummond and his Legacies: The League of Nations and the Beginnings of Global Governance,  (2019) p. 105: 
“The League’s work was ground-breaking. Countries around the world began to accept practices by 
international civil servants that were quite new, such as: the in-country presence of technical staff in Poland and 
Russia; organizing financial rescue packages for countries in economic and financial meltdown; impartial 
international scrutiny of large states in the case of the indigenous populations of mandated territories and of 
smaller states in the case of the protection of minorities; supporting the implementation of norms established by 
the League’s governing bodies, and the practice, championed by Monnet, of tackling international problems by 
bringing together specialists rather than going through diplomatic intermediaries”.  
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an innovation.16 If this feature of the LoN is combined with its comprehensive mandate, the 
LoN were bound to become a “living organism”;17 able to expand and mature organically.   
 In addition to the above, the LoN also set up an impressive array of subsidiary bodies 
Committees, Commissions and Specialised Agencies. These include the Economic and 
Financial Organisation18, the League of Nations Health Organisation19, the Communications 
and Transit Organisation (CTO), which dealt with pressing needs in the area of “ ail transport, 
inland  navigation, ports and maritime navigation, road traffic and power transmission”, the 
International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) whose members, among others, 
included Marie Curie and Albert Einstein. These agencies employed “experts” and specialists 
from the sciences (or other professions), campaigners and worked with voluntary organisations 
to collect data, conduct research, prepare reports, and formulate policies. 20  They contributed 
to the LoN’s economic, humanitarian, and scientific work and the LoN acted as coordinator 
and supervisor.21 It is worth mentioning that these “specialised” agencies consumed more than 
50 per cent of the League’s budget in the late 1930s and were the most expansive, global and 
successful institutions that also survived the demise of the League. In this respect, it is also 
important to mention the ILO that was created as affiliated agency with tripartite membership 
consisting of employers, employees and governments and which became a specialised agency 
under the UN as well as  the Permanent Court of International Justice (which was not formally 
a LoN organ but was organically linked to the LoN) and continued in the form of the 
International Court of Justice. 
 It transpires from the above that the overall aim of the LoN was to establish an 
integrated system of world order by regulating world-wide interactions by pooling together 
sovereignty, organising the use of “violence”, dealing on a permanent basis with common 
problems, setting out the rules of the world order, and by settling disputes peacefully. In this 
regard, it also promoted change in world society through peaceful means22 and offered the 
 
16 It was dubbed “a great experiment in international administration”; Egon F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, The 
International Secretariat: A Great Experiment In International Administration (1945) p. 128–30. 
17 John Fischer Williams, Chapters on Current International Law and the League of Nations (1929) p. 479. 
18 Louis W. Pauly, The League of Nations and the foreshadowing of the International Metary Fund: Essays in 
International Finance (1966) p. 201. 
19 Paul Weindling, International Health Organisations and Movements, 1918–1939 (2009). 
20 Charles K. Nichols, “The Statistical Work of the League of Nations in Economic, Financial and Related 
Fields”, 37 Journal of the American Statistical Association (1942) pp. 219. 
21 Art. 23 of the Covenant.  
22 See Art. 19 of the Covenant. 
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prospect of inward and outward expansion and maturation of the world order it established 
through its mechanisms. 
 The legacy and footprints of the LoN are evident in its successor organisation, the UN, 
whose institutional structure, aims and practices bear remarkable similarities to those of the 
LoN. But the most critical contribution of the LoN to the world political economy and indeed 
its novel contribution is, first, that it established a single institution as the site of world order 
and global governance and, second, that it established a network of institutions under its 
supervision as complementary sites of global governance. Regarding the former, the LoN is 
indeed the first instance of global governance23 attached to and exercised by a single institution. 
However, it should be noted that global governance is not the same as global government which 
presupposes centralised legislation and enforcement24 a d, moreover, global governance does 
not supplant state government which in international law and relations is still omnipotent. This 
immediately raises the question of how, in the absence of global government, a global 
governance institution can navigate through the counter-forces of state governments, an issue 
that the LoN was not able to tackle leading to its demise as an institution but it did not lead to 
the demise of the idea of attaching world governance to a single institution as the creation of 
the UN which succeeded the LoN testifies.  
 The second contribution of the LoN to world order governance is, as I said, the network 
of specialised agencies it created as sites of complementary governance.These agencies crafted 
norms, policies, practices, processes, and structures that supported but also shaped global 
governance. They were part of the LoN’s project to preserve peace not only through military 
means but also through non-political means and methods. The aim of these agencies was to 
satisfy human needs which, if left unattended, could provoke conflicts. Their creation was the 
result of the realisation that the state is not always able or the right site to deliver such goods 
and that for this reason states should cooperate. These agencies thus offered a less political site 
for state cooperation - when political cooperation otherwise seemed difficult – and, more 
critically, they  were able to foster habits of cooperation in general. Furthermore, even if they 
seem to pose no direct challenge to state sovereignty since they were engaging in ‘low politics’, 
, state sovereignty was gradually eroded through the extension of  their network across 
sovereignties and by relocating people’s allegiance from the national state to such agencies. 
 
23 James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in 
World Politics (1992) ch. 1. 
24 Claude, supra note 6, p. 411-444. 
9 
 
For example, the LoN’s policies and practices regarding the protection of minorities, health, 
labour or territorial administration have reformulated the meaning of state sovereignty. This 
aspect of the LoN’s governance structure is a manifestation of the functionalist approach to 
peace which informs specialised agencies established under the UN as well as international 
organisations such as the EU.25 
 All in all, the LoN stands at the junction of the previous pre-institutional world order 
which was disorganised and war-festered and the new institutionalised world order which is 
rules-based and peaceful.26 Recalling once more David Kennedy’s study of international 
institutions, he identified three themes in the discipline of international institutional law: the 
break with the past, the move to institutions, and the practice of repetition which sustains the 
move to institutions.27 The LoN fulfils all three themes: it represents a rupture with the past; it
introduced a new world order and a global governance structure evolving around a single 
institution; and that practice was replicated as in the case of  the UN.  
3.2 Collective security  
Collective security is an institution for maintaining international peace and security and, at the 
same time, it is also an idea - a conception - as to how peace can be preserved in a world of 
sovereign states. In a collective security system there are set rules and methods according to 
which peace is maintained, with the security of each member guaranteed through common 
action.28 As an institution for preserving the peace, collective security is a global institution 
regarding membership, rules and mandate and it is such globality that differentiates it from 
other ideas and institutions for preserving the peace such as alliances which are subjective and 
partial.  
 The LoN was the first instance of international organisation that institutionalised 
collective security which was hailed as “the one great object of the whole organization”.29 The 
 
25 Victor-Yves Ghébali, V.-Y. “‘The League of Nations and Functionalism”’, p. 152 in A. Groom, A., and P. 
Taylor, P. (eds.) (1975), Functionalism:— Theory and Practice in International Relations (Crane Russak, New 
York, 1975) pp. 152; Ernst .B. Haass, Beyond the Nations State: Functionalism and International Organization, 
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964); David Mitrany, A Wording Peace System: An Argument for the 
Functional Development of Inter-national Organization (4th ed.n, London: National Peace Council [by 
arrangement with the Royal Institute of International Affairs], 1946) 
26 Claude, supra note 6, p. 41  
27  Kennedy, supra note 14, pp. 849-903. 
 
28 Claude, supra note 6, p. 245-263. 
29 The League of Nation Starts: an Outline of its Organisers (London, McMillan & Co., 1920),  p. 26, available 
at: https://archive.org/details/leagueofnationss00lond/page/n6/mode/2up  (last accessed on 31 March 2020 ). 
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novelty of the League’s collective security system can be revealed by comparing it to its 
immediate predecessor: the institution of the balance of power introduced by the Concert of 
Europe. That system was Euro-centric and based on an equilibrium of power rather than on a 
common concern to oppose aggression. Furthermore, it lacked institutional support in the form 
of organs or rules but was based on ad hoc meetings and informal understandings. Moreover, 
it imposed no obligations on its members. In contrast, the LoN’s collective security system was 
global in that it encompassed all members of the LoN, which were not only European, and 
operated under a legal framework which defined the triggers of the system and the process to 
be followed when disputes arose. These rules were abstract, general and applied equally to all 
its members. The system was also endowed with organs such as the Council, the Assembly and 
the Secretariat which operated and managed it.   
 The LoN’s collective security system was grounded on three main pillars: the regulation 
of armaments, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and collective action. Before presenting 
these pillars, it is important to mention certain other provisions of the Covenant which 
demonstrate the global vocation of the League, th  public nature of its activities and the 
responsibilities of each and every member for maintaining peace which are hallmarks of the 
institution of collective security.30 First, in the Preamble, states assumed an obligation not to 
resort to war although, as will be discussed later, that was not an absolute and comprehensive 
obligation. However, it was an improvement compared to the previous regime which 
sanctioned war as remedy or as a means of realising the national interest and, above all, 
legitimised the spoils of war. Second, Article 10 imposed on members an obligation to respect 
and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political 
independence of all members of the League and, third, Article 11 made “any war or threat of 
war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not” a matter of 
concern to the whole League. The implementation of these two articles was left to th  Council, 
which could advise on the measures states should take in this regard. These articles What the 
above also reveal is that the Covenant removed war from the sphere of private justice and made 
war an international sanction, albeit privately executed. In other words, war became an 
international public law sanction. That said, there is a paradox in how the Covenant approached 
war and its relation with law; the Covenant treated war as either sanction or delict and used 
war to sanction the law while at the same time it used law to prevent war.  
 
30 However, it does not include domestic war which would have stretched the point. See Art. 15(8) of the 
Covenant.  
11 
 
 Moving now to the first pillar of the LoN’s collective security namely, the regulation 
of armaments, this was viewed as critical in preventing wars through transparency and 
balancing. League members were obligated to reduce them “to the lowest point consistent with 
national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations”, with the 
Council making the necessary recommendation and revising it every ten years.31 That said, 
there was no mechanism for monitoring states’ policies and no sanctions for evading the rules.  
 Regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes, according to Article 12, if a dispute arose 
that could lead to rupture of the peace, members were required to submit it to arbitration, to 
judicial settlement, or to inquiry by the Council. Resort to the Council was compulsory if states 
failed to use the other mechanisms and meant that states could not avoid their duty to settle 
disputes peacefully by claiming that the dispute was non-legal. Moreover, any member could 
bring to the attention of the Council or the Assembly “any circumstance whatever which 
threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between 
nations upon which peace depends”,32 which indicates the global vocation of the LoN and the 
responsibilities of each member state for the maintenance of peace. States also agreed not to 
resort to war until three months after the arbitration award, the court judgment or the report by 
the Council and, in any case, not to go to war against the state that has complied with them.33 
Article 16 established a platform for collective action although it remained decentralised as far 
as decision-making and execution were concerned. According to Article 16, members of the 
League could impose sanctions on a state that went to war in disregard of the provisions of the 
Covenant concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes. The novelty of the system was that 
sanctions became part of the collective security sanctioning process and were removed from 
the individual sanctioning process. However, states made their own assessment as to whether 
a breach took place and imposed sanctions unilaterally even if sanctions involved resort to war. 
The sanctioning process was thus decentralised with the Council of the League having power 
to only recommend and not mandate the imposition of sanctions.  
 What transpires from the above is that there were a number of defects in the LoN’s 
collective security system. The most important was that the Covenant did not actually prohibit 
war as such whereas subsequent attempts to prohibit war, such as in the Geneva Protocol34 or 
 
31 Art. 8 of the Covenant.  
32 Art. 11(2) of the Covenant. 
33 Arts 13-15 of the Covenant. 
34 Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1924).  
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the Kellogg Briand Pact,35 were either unsuccessful or left many gaps. To that a number of 
other defect should be mentioned. First, the Covenant’s legalism regarding the collective 
security triggers condemned it to rigidity. As was noted above, it was triggered when there was 
a breach of its provisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes. Second, its grounding 
on the principle of sovereign equality which  translated into unanimity in decision-making and 
into decentralised action condemned the system to paralysis, inaction or unequal action. Third 
and related to the above,the Council or the Assembly could only make recommendations which 
meant that states were not obligated to follow them but even more critically, they could lawfully 
distance themselves from their obligations under th Covenant. Although the Geneva Protocol 
tried to address these defects by strengthening the mechanism of dispute settlement, it was not 
accepted by states. 
 That said, to make war unlawful if there was no previous recourse to peaceful 
mechanisms of dispute settlement and to place certain restrictions on the timing and the target 
of war, was a novelty if viewed against the previous state of unlimited war. As a matter of fact, 
with the Covenant world order moves to bellum legale which places international law at the 
centre of war assessments.36 To explain, the Covenant provided a sequence of formal steps for 
the peaceful settlement of disputes that made war lawful or unlawful depending on whether 
they were followed or not. In doing this, it removed war from the domain of morality and the 
just war theory where the justness of war was a matter of values and international law had no 
input.  
Another important contribution of the LoN is that it made war a concern of the whole League 
even if no member was involved in the initiation of war. This was a radical innovation in 
comparison to the previous state of affairs which were based on narrowly defined national 
interests and where war was a bilateral affair whereby all other states were supposed to hold a 
position of absolute neutrality towards the belligerents. It represents a shift from the 
bilateralism of positivist international law where states had rights and narrowly defined and 
explicitly contracted obligations to a global community of interest where states have 
obligations but also responsibilities towards the wider community.37 This all demonstrates the 
 
35 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (1928). 
36 Arnold D. McNair, “Collective Security”, 17 BYIL (1936) pp. 150, 154; Josef L., Kunz, “Bellum Justum and 
Bellum Legale”, 45 AJIL (1951) pp. 528ff. 
37 Quincy Wright,  “Effects of the League of Nations Covenant”, 13 The American Political Science Review 
(1919) pp. 556, 557, 565: “it follows that international law can no longer be conceived by text writers as a series 
of deductions from an assumed "fundamental right of states to exist”; “The responsibility of states to assure the 
existence of the law will have to be conceived as even more fundamental” ; “the covenant recognizes that states 
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world order and global governance character of the League with states assuming obligations 
and responsibilities as global citizens.   
 The importance of the LoN in the area of peace and security also rests on the fact that 
social, humanitarian and technical issues were linked to the maintenance of peace. As stated in 
the preceding section, they were part of the LoN’s global project to preserve the peace, not 
only through political and military means as in the case of its collective security, but also 
through social, economic, human rights or cultural means. In doing so, the LoN gave another 
dimension to these issues and to the institutions it created by linking them to the peace project. 
At the same time, it gave another facet to peace by viewing it not just as negative peace based 
on the absence of war but also as positive peace by laying down the conditions for maintaining 
the peace.38 It is interesting to mention in this regard the ILO constitution which says in its 
Preamble that “universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social 
justice”, and then continues by saying, “whereas conditions of labour exist involving such 
injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that 
the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of those conditions is 
urgently require”, and finally justifies the creation of the ILO by saying that “The High 
Contracting Parties, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity as well as by the desire to 
secure the permanent peace of the world”. 
 The LoN’s footprint can be seen in the UN collective security which also tried to 
address some of the defects of the LoN’s system. Firstly, the UN system is not attached to any 
peace settlement which marks its political, legal and moral detachment from the status quo 
created by the war, whereas the Covenant was attached to the 1919 Peace Treaty; something 
that denied it flexibility and also marred it with accusations that it was more or less another 
instrument of victors’ justice. Secondly, the UN collective security prohibits the unilateral use 
of force except in self-defence or when authorised by the Security Council. In this way it totally 
excommunicates war and, even more critically, it prohibits any use of force which is more 
inclusive than ‘war’ whose definition has always been debated. Thirdly, the criteria for 
activating the collective security system are framed in political terms as a threat to or breach of 
the peace, or an act of aggression which provides the system with more flexibility and allows 
it to adapt and evolve in light of changing circumstance. This is in contrast to the LN’s triggers 
 
cannot survive where sovereignty can override the law. As the price of existence, states must accept definite 
responsibilities for the maintenance of law”.  
38 Johan Galtung, “Peace, Negative and Positive’ in N.J. Young (ed.), Oxford International Encyclopaedia of 
Peace, vol. 3 (2010) pp. 352ff . 
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which, as discussed, were legal in the sense of violations of the Covenant obligations 
concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes. Fourthly, decision-making and action was 
centralised in the Security Council which has primary responsibility in peace and security and 
whose decisions are binding in contrast to the devolved op ration of the LoN’s system. Fifthly, 
whereas the LoN’s Council operated by unanimity,39 in the SC it is only the five permanent 
members that have the veto power in recognition of their responsibilities    
 To conclude this section, the LoN’s collective security and the LoN’s approach to peace 
as was shown focused on war prevention and war suppression by dealing with military and 
non-military causes of war but it was less about peace enforcement which is one of the main 
tasks of the UN. To do so would have required a radical approach to state sovereignty which 
at the time states were not ready to accept.  
3.3 International law 
The LoN introduced international law as a core institution of world order. Yet, the Covenant 
was still criticised by those who preferred a more legalistic LoN, such as Elihu Root who wrote: 
“[w]e are left with a program which rests the hope of the whole world for future peace in a 
government of men, and not of laws, following the dictates of expediency, and not of right”.40 
However, such criticism is not fair. The LoN provided the legal framework according to which 
international relations should be conducted, facilitated the development of international law, 
but also transformed its conceptual substructure.41 
 First, the Covenant was a legal document and, indeed, an international law treaty which 
clothed in legal authority the LoN’s vision of world order. In this regard, international law was  
the source of the existence, organisation and operation of the LoN’s scheme of world order.  
Secondly, the Covenant exhibited constitutional traits and, according to Hersch 
Lauterpacht, it was in the mould of a constitutional charter.42 For example, according to Article 
 
39 Art. 15 of the Covenant exempted from voting the state involved in a dispute even if that state was one of the 
Great Powers which allowed the Council to impose for example sanctions on Italy following its attack on 
Abyssinia in 1935. 
40 Quoted in Stephen Wertheim, ‘The League of Nations: A Retreat From International Law?’ 7 Journal of 
Global History (2012) pp. 210, 228. 
41 Nicolas Politis, The New Aspects of International Law: A Series of Lectures Delivered at Columbia University 
in July 1926 (1928). As Quincy Wright wrote: “…the covenant when put in operation will modify international 
law, though less in its specific rules than in certain assumptions upon which they ave heretofore been supposed 
to rest”. Wright, “Effects of the League of Nations Covenant”. supra note 37, pp. 556. 
42 Hersch Lauterpacht, “Japan and the Covenant”, 3 Political Quarterly (1932), pp. 174. For Zimmern, the 
Covenant was neither a constitution nor a treaty. Zimmern, supra note 2, p. 283-291. 
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20 of the Covenant, all inconsistent obligations were abrogated.43 This provision established 
the normative hierarchy of the Covenant and is of a different mould than Article 103 of the UN 
Charter which, by declaring the primacy of UN obligations in cases of conflict with other 
obligations, is equivalent to a conflict of norms provision.44  
Third, , the LoN introduced a “rules-based” world order in contrast to the previous 
system of world order where law played no role in its formulation or operation. According to 
its preamble, the League was based on the firm understanding that international law is the 
actual rule of conduct among states.  
 Fouth, the League’s collective security, as was said, was law-oriented and in that sense 
it was more legalistic than the UN’s collective security.45 As explained previously, what 
triggered the League’s collective security was a breach of the legal provisions contained in the 
Covenant regarding the pacific settlement of disputes and not the notion of a threat to the peace 
or breach of the peace as it is the case in the UN Charter which are not legal concepts. 
Moreover, the Covenant excluded from the peaceful settlement matters that fell within a state’s 
domestic jurisdiction as defined by international law. In contrast, the UN Charter permits 
collective action within a state’s domestic jurisdiction.46  
 Fifht, the LoN contributed to law-making by fostering the adoption of international 
agreements such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact and expanded the fields of international regulation 
 
43 Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Covenant as the ‘Higher Law”’, 17 BYIL (1936) pp. 54. 
44 That notwithstanding, the UN Charter is being viewed as the constitution of the international society.  
45 Carl Schmitt criticised the juridification of international affairs by the League based on his wn approach to 
law and politics. As he wrote “… if one were to organize the settlement of all international conflicts in such a 
way as to subject all states to a judicial or at least a formal procedure, one would, assuming that all are indeed 
willing to subject themselves, impose on international law the burden of deciding the most terrible conflicts 
without any clear principles or stable rules but in the name of the law. … Who could dare to attempt this worst 
endangerment of the law in the name of the law?” Carl Schmitt, “Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes” in C 
Schmitt, Frieden oder Pazifismus? Arbeiten zum Völkerrecht und zur internationalen Politik 1924–1973 (G 
Maschke ed., 2005) pp. 127-8. Hans Kelsen instead criticised the League and attributed its failure to the fact that 
it did not put the court  but the Council at the centre of its organisation. Hans Kelsen, Peace through Law (1944) 
p. 49-57.  
46 Art. 2(7) UN Charter. 
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for example to minority rights,47 slavery,48 equality between men and women,49 trafficking in 
women,50 the rights of children,51 refugees,52 health,53 trade and the international economy.54  
Sixth, the LoN challenged older notions about the subjects of international law. It 
recognised the role of individuals in international law even if their legal position was limited 
and qualified.55 This was later confirmed by the PCIJ in the Danzig Advisory Opinion.56 It also 
dealt with the question of  whether entities, such as international organisations in the mould of 
the LoN,57 have legal personality. In doing so, a host of other legal questions surfaced such as 
the scope of the powers of its organs, issues of responsibility, or the relations between League 
organs and member-states. These are questions that concern global governance since then.  
 Seventh, the LoN contributed to the codification of international law. In 1924, the 
Assembly established the Committee of Experts on the Progressive Codification of 
International Law which “was the first attempt on a worldwide basis to codify and develop 
whole fields of international law rather than simply regulating individual and specific legal 
problems”.58 It convened a Codification Conference in 1930 to address topics such as 
nationality; territorial waters and the responsibility of States for damage done in their territory 
to the person or property of foreigners. It led to the adoption of the Convention on Certain 
 
47 Lucy P. Mair, The Protection of Minorities: The Working and Scope of the Minorities Treaties under the 
League of Nations(1928); Peter Hilpold, “The League of Nations and the Protection of Minorities – 
Rediscovering a Great Experiment”, 17 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2013) pp. 87; Péter 
Kovács, “The Protection of Minorities under the Auspices of the League of Nations”, in D. Shelton (ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (2013) pp. 325. 
48 See 1926 Slavery Convention, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/ilo_1926_slavery_convention_en_1.pdf (last accessed on 27 March 2020). 
49 Art. 7 of the Covenant.  
50 Art. 23 of the Covenant; 1933 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full 
Age; Deborah Stienstra, Women’s Movements and International Organizations (1994). 
51 1924 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child. 
52 See 1933 League of Nations Convention Related to the International Status of Refugee, which codified the 
principle of non-refoulement. 
53 Paul Weindling, International Health Organisations and Movements, 1918–1939 (2009). 
54 Wallace McClure, World Prosperity as Sought through the Economic Work of the League of Nations (1933); 
Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy: the Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946 (2013). 
55 Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law: With Special Reference to 
International Arbitration (1927) p. 74-79; Frederick S. Dunn, “The International Rights of Individuals,” 35 
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1941) pp. 14; Philip Jessup, 
“The Subjects of a Modern Law of Nations,” 45 Michigan Law Review (1947) pp. 384. 
56 Pecuniary Claims of Danzig Railway Officials Who Have Passed into the Polish Service, Against the Polish 
Railways Administration, (Advisory Opinion), [1928] PCIJ Ser B No 15; Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Subjects of 
the Law of Nations [Part II]” 64 LQR (1948) pp. 97, 98; Kate Parlett, “The PCIJ’s Opinion in Jurisdiction of the 
Courts of Danzig. Individual Rights under Treaties” 10 J of the History of Intl L (2008) pp. 119. 
57 Lassa Oppenheim, “Le caractère essentiel de la société des nations”, 26 RGDIP (1919) pp. 234; Percy 
Corbett, ‘What is the League of Nations?’, 5 British YIL (1924) pp. 119; John Fischer Williams, Chapters on 
Current International Law and the League of Nations (1929) ch. xv. 
58 Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/league.shtml (last accessed on 27 March 2020). 
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Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws.59 Furthermore, the LoN contributed to 
the development and codification of international law through its specialised agencies or 
through the registration of treaties60 but also in more indirect ways. The League provided a 
forum where international law was discussed in its organs, Commissions, Committees and 
specialised agencies, offering thus a centralised platform for the development of international 
law. In this respect, it also moulded the process of law production by shaping state consent 
which still remains the basis of international law.  
 Eighth, the LoN contributed to the development of international law and to the legal 
settlement of disputes through the PCIJ. Although the Court was not formally an organ of the 
League, the two were closely connected not only because the Court was established on the 
basis of Article 14 of the Covenant but also because of administrative and financial links. More 
critically though, the Court formed an organic community with the League by contributing to 
the League’s aim of peaceful settlement of disputes. As was seen, the judicial settlement of 
disputes was part of the LoN’s collective security system. Even if the Court did not address 
disputes of critical importance, it systematised in the most authoritative way the development 
and interpretation of international law by its jurisprudence. As Ole Spiermann wrote: “Obscure 
cases decided by the Permanent Court are household names, familiar to present generations of 
international lawyers, because they were, by chance, the first place for authoritative expression 
of various principles of general international law. Such statements of principle have found wide 
use far beyond their original context”.61  
 Finally, on a more general level of legal theory, the League revamped natural law 
doctrines which were in decline due to the ascendance of positivism.62 Although it operated 
within a positivist framework of international law based on state consent, its global vocation 
and its engagement with issues such as minorities, nationality, or mandates led to the 
resurrection of natural law in order to curb the excesses of positivism and nationalism. For 
 
59 Convention on certain questions relating to the conflict of nationality laws (League of Nati ns, Treaty Series, 
vol. 179, p. 89). It also adopted Protocol relating to military obligations in certain cases of double nationality 
(ibid., vol. 178, p. 227) and Protocol relating to a certain case of statelessness (ibid., vol. 179, p. 115). 
60 Art. 18 of the Covenant.  
61 Ole Spiermann, International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice: The Rise of 
the International Judiciary (2005) p. 399. 
62 Henri Rolin in the discussion following Vladimir R. Idelson, “The Law of Nations and the Individual,” 30 
Transactions of the Grotius Society (1944) pp. 75. 
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example, the LoN set the normative and institutional scene for the development of human rights 
law63 or for the development of constitutional approaches to international law.  
 The above demonstrates that the LoN was the midwife to an contemporary international 
law which is of a different mould and scope than that of the previous period.  
 
4 Conclusion  
To conclude, the LoN was the first experiment of world order governance by embracing the 
notion of ‘one world’, by placing an international organisation at the centre of such world order 
governance and by laying down its institutions. Consequently, the LoN has left a lasting imprint 
on world order that transcends its caricature as a failure; it has shaped the way we view world 
orders, standardised the machinery of world orders and formulated the vocabulary we use to 
describe them. It has also shaped the architecture of the current world order either through 
lessons drawn from its failures or by lending t its institutional and ideological pillars. The UN 
is the fulcrum of the contemporary world order whose aims, structure, collective security 
system, specialised agencies, principles and values, its treatment of colonies, its universalism, 
all refer back to the League, of course with the necessary adaptations generated by the 
knowledge of the League’s failures and successes. It can thus be said with reason that the 
current world order is rooted in the LoN.  
 This does not mean that the contemporary world order, its institutions and its 
underpinning ideology are always able to respond to current social, environmental, political, 
economic, cultural, or technological challenges, to shifts in the distribution of power or the 
resurgence of a competitive streak of intolerant nationalism; t is indeed under strain, its 
institutions are called into question and there are concerns about its sustainability. Often 
parallels are drawn between our current predicament and the turbulent circumstances that led 
to the creation of the LoN but, whereas the LoN represented a vision and a scheme to address 
challenges and to establish a peaceful world order, what is lacking now is a vision of a different, 
alternative, world order to address current challenges. While those statesmen who gathered in 
 
63 It has been said that human rights replaced the League’s focus on protecting minorities. Mark Mazower, “The 
Strange Triumph of Human Rights 1933–1950” 47 The Historical Journal (2004) pp. 379–398.    
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Paris proffered a vision of a new world order,64 contemporary statesmen have not done so. 
Such lack of vision also shows how entrenched in political and legal thinking is the LoN’s 
order and its institutions. Is it possible, for instance, to answer the question of how a new world 
order would look like without the ideas and institutions inherited by the League? Even if the 
existing world order moulded by the League is to be replaced by another order, in my opinion, 
it will still replicate - with the necessary adaptations - the foundational ideas and governance 
institutions introduced by the LoN which gained their authority through trial and error.   
 
 
64 See for example President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points 8 January, 1918, available at: 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp (last accessed on 27 March 2020);  Jan C. Smuts, The 
League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion (1918). 
